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ABSTRACT
The education reform movement includes efforts to raise teacher quality through stricter certification
and licensing provisions. Most US states now require public school teachers to pass a standardized
test such as the National Teacher Examination. Although any barrier to entry is likely to raise wages
in the affected occupation, the theoretical effects of such requirements on teacher quality are
ambiguous. Teacher testing places a floor on whatever skills are measured by the required test, but
testing is also costly for applicants. These costs shift teacher supply to the left and may be especially
likely to deter high-quality applicants from teaching in the public schools. We use the Schools and
Staffing Survey to estimate the effect of state teacher testing requirements on teacher wages and
teacher quality as measured by educational background. The results suggest that state-mandated
teacher testing increases teacher wages with no corresponding increase in quality.
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angrist@mit.edu jonathan.guryan@gsb.uchicago.edu1Testing of teachers is not a new phenomenon.  Teachers were tested in basic subjects in many states in the
19
th century and at the beginning of the 20
th century.  However, in most states the tests were graded and certificates
were issued at the county level.  In the early part of the 20
th Century a number of states began more widespread use
of testing for certification. But World War II led to a decrease in teacher supply and a subsequent increase in hiring
of teachers with alternative certification.  As a result, most states had discontinued the use of required teacher testing
by the end of the war.
2Since 1998, the ETS National Teachers Examination widely used to certify Education School graduates for
work as teachers has been known as the Praxis II and is part of a series that includes Praxis I, also known as the Pre-
Professional Skills test (PPST) which is used to screen applicants to Education Schools, and a series of classroom
performance assessments known as Praxis III.  Many states (e.g., Minnesota as of September 2001) require both
Praxis I and Praxis II. As of this writing, sample Praxis content is available at
http://www.ets.org/praxis/download.html.   The Praxis examinations consist of dozens of subtests. Each state selects
their own credentialing requirements.  Some states, such as California, require a combination of Praxis tests and
locally developed tests, others, such as Massachusetts, rely on a locally developed exam only.
Economists, educators, and policymakers generally agree that better teachers are likely to lead to
better schools.  But the question of how to attract better teachers remains open.  A natural economic solution
is to raise teacher pay.  From 1960 to 1998, teacher salaries rose in real terms by 43 percent, outpacing non-
teacher salaries.  At the same time, the IQ scores of those who chose to teach fell, and evidence on the
relationship between salaries and measures of teacher quality or performance is mixed (Hanushek, Kain, and
Rivkin, 1999; Murnane, et al, 1991;  Figlio, 2002).
Beginning in the 1960’s, states began testing prospective teachers in a direct effort to ensure teachers
meet minimum standards for basic skills and subject knowledge.
1 By 1999, 43 states required applicants to
pass some sort of standardized certification test such as the National Teacher Examination or Praxis
examinations published by the Educational Testing Service.
2  Although there is some reciprocity in the form
of probationary and provisional licensing, states relying on tests typically require newly employed teachers
to pass their own tests even if they are licensed in other states.  As a theoretical matter, the impact of such
testing is ambiguous.  Test requirements may establish a minimum achievement standard, as their proponents
argue, but certification requirements may also deter applicants from choosing to teach.  Moreover, stricter
certification procedures may be seen as especially costly hurdles by experienced teachers or teachers with
attractive employment options in other fields.
In this paper, we estimate the impact of state-mandated certification tests on teacher quality.  Data2
for our study come from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), a nationally representative repeated cross-
section of teachers and schools, initially conducted during the 1987-88 school year and most recently
available for 1999-2000.  This sample coverage is useful since testing requirements have grown most sharply
in recent years.  In addition to providing information on teacher salaries, the 1987-88, 1993-94, and 1999-
2000 waves of SASS include measures of teacher educational background that we take to be indicators of
teacher quality.  We first show that the impact of state provisions on the prevalence of teacher testing is about
50 percentage points.  Consistent with the notion that certification requirements establish barriers to entry,
we also find that teacher testing increases teacher salaries.  On the other hand, we find no evidence that
testing increases the quality of colleges attended by new teachers or the likelihood that teachers teach
material studied in college or graduate school.
BACKGROUND
A 1986 report of the Carnegie Task Force on Education and a follow-up report released in 1996
called for the introduction of more centralized systems of certification for public school teachers.  A policy
of stricter and more centralized teacher licensing has also been supported by the National Education
Association and a range of groups promoting education reform (Ballou and Podgursky, 2000).  Proposed
licensing systems involve the accreditation of education programs, longer apprenticeships, and teacher
testing.  Proponents of teacher licensing point to the spread of medical licensure in the early 20
th Century as
evidence that licensing raises professional standards.  On the other hand, economists have long warned that
licensing and certification are potentially cost-raising barriers to entry (see, e.g., Friedman and Kuznets,
1945).  Moreover, there is little hard evidence for any consumer benefits of mandatory occupational
licensing, even in medicine.  In this paper, we attempt to estimate the impact of what is perhaps the simplest
component of teacher licensing provisions, a requirement that teachers pass a certification test that can be
seen as analogous to medical boards and legal bar exams.  3The literature on occupational regulation distinguishes between mandatory licensing such as that required
of medical professionals and voluntary certification such as that sometimes obtained by auto mechanics.
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In a recent survey of research on occupational licensing, Kleiner (2000) observes that more American
workers are affected by licensing requirements than belong to unions or are covered by the minimum wage.
Yet there are remarkably few studies of the impact of licensing on wages or productivity.  Standard economic
arguments suggest licensing provisions are likely to affect economic outcomes through a number of channels.
First, occupational licensing may provide a signal of worker quality and help to maintain quality standards
when information about quality is imperfect.  Indeed, this is the stated rationale for government-imposed
licensing requirements.  As Kleiner (2000) notes, however, the evidence of consumer benefits from most
licensing requirements is thin or nonexistent. In addition, mandatory licensing requirements impose a barrier
to occupational entry that is likely to increase wages in the licensed occupation.
3 
One of the few previous attempts to estimate the effect of licensing requirements is a study of
teachers by Kleiner and Petree (1988), who link state licensing requirements with average teacher pay,
pupils’ SAT and ACT scores, and high school graduation rates.  Their results show no clear relationship
between licensing and pupil achievement or teacher pay, though there is a robust negative relationship
between licensing and pupil-teacher ratios. The authors attribute the ambiguous results on licensing to the
weak licensing provisions in force during their sample period.  The recent strengthening of state teacher
licensing provisions may provide stronger evidence on licensing effects.  Another related study is Goldhaber
and Brewer (2000), who link student achievement with state teacher licensing and testing requirements.
Their analysis does not exploit changes in state provisions over time, and the effects of testing enter only as
interactions with other licensing provisions.   Consistent with the entry-barriers story, Hanushek and Pace
(1995) find that state requirements for courses and tests significantly lower the probability prospective
teachers complete training, again using cross-state variation.  
Most studies of the economic consequences of occupational licensing look at the medical and dental4Licenses for dentistry appear to be the most widely studied in research on licensure.  See Kleiner and
Kudrle (2000) for references to earlier work on dentists.  Kleiner (2000) also compares wages in licensed
occupations with wages in unlicensed occupations requiring approximately the same level of education and training.
4
professions.  In a study of dentistry, for example, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) found that people in states with
strictly regulated entry to dentistry had dental health that is no better than those in states with less regulation.
Dental regulation, however, does appear to increase both the hourly earnings of dentists and consumers’ cost
of dental care.
4  Similarly, in a recent study of immigrant physicians in Israel, Kugler and Sauer (2003) found
that  immigrant physicians who obtained a license to practice medicine in Israel had sharply higher earnings
than those who did not.   At the same time, a comparison of OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimates
of the effect of licensing suggests that doctors who obtain licenses and end up practicing medicine have
lower earnings potential than those who do not.   Thus, licensing appears to reduce average quality.  It should
be noted, however, that teachers differ from medical professionals in that they are more likely to work in the
public sector.  Certification may be more necessary to reveal worker quality in the absence of the market
forces more likely to operate in the private sector. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Although the theoretical impact of teacher testing on wages seems clear cut, the effect of testing on
quality is less so. The policy objective that motivates teacher testing, as with other worker screening devices,
is to identify and hire those most qualified to teach.  In practice, however, the design of effective testing
strategies is difficult since tests are noisy predictors of worker quality.  Moreover, testing is costly for
employers and employees.  Teacher supply therefore shifts as salaries must compensate workers for their
time and effort in being tested.  Finally, risk averse workers will view employment offers that are contingent
on stochastic test results as less attractive than unconditional offers.  
A large theoretical literature has looked at the impact of worker screening mechanisms on wages and
job assignments.  We use basic elements of the Gausch and Weiss (1980, 1981) setup to discuss the possible5See also Lelande (1979).  For more recent and more elaborate models along these lines, see, e.g., Wand
(1997) and Wang and Weiss (1998).
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implications of standardized testing for teacher quality.
5  Because school districts are not necessarily profit
maximizers or even costs minimizers, we focus on the impact of test-based hiring standards on teachers’
labor supply, as opposed to the more complex question of how worker testing affects equilibria in
competitive markets.
Suppose an applicant for a teaching job can earn an alternative wage, wi, and teachers are paid w.
Applicants must be tested to get a job, a process which they view as costing an amount c.  We can think of
c as a monetary cost or as the cost of time and effort directed towards preparation and completion of the test.
More generally, testing might involve a probationary period, in which case any wage reduction during the
probationary period is part of the testing cost.  
Worker i passes the test with probability pi.  We presume the test has some screening value, so that
pi and wi are positively correlated.  In other words, higher quality applicants, as measured by outside earnings
potential, are more likely to pass the test.  Assuming teachers maximize expected utility with von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility of income U(C), applicant i must be offered a wage that satisfies 
pi U(w!c) + (1-pi)U(wi!c) $ U(wi)( 1 )
if he or she is to find it worth applying.  Clearly with a higher c, the wages offered teachers, w, must be
higher to obtain an applicant pool of the same quality.  This is the entry-barrier effect on wages; positive c
reduces the supply of applicants, holding the underlying distribution of quality level wi fixed.  Note also that
this effect is larger with risk averse than with risk-neutral applicants.  Risk-neutral applicants require only
that pi(w!wi) $ c.
How does testing affect average quality?  Continuing to think of quality as indexed by the alternate
wage, wi, suppose that school boards would like to select applicants with wi$w G.  For simplicity, suppose also
that applicants are risk neutral and that the certification test can be designed so that pi=1 if wi$w G and is zero6Alternately, applicants with higher wi may also be better test-takers, implying c and wi are negatively
correlated.  Then increased costs will tend to deter lower the average wi among applicants. The size of the net effect
of testing is the empirical question addressed below.
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otherwise.  Then average teacher quality in the testing regime is 
E[wi | w!c > wi $ w G]. (2)
This average can be compared with the average teacher quality without testing, which is equal to E[wi | w >
wi].  Clearly the quality comparison depends on how w and c are determined.  The imposition of a lower
bound,  w G, tends to increase quality. But if testing is viewed as very costly, so that the net teacher wage in
the testing regime, w!c, is less than the teacher wage without testing, average quality may decline. This
decline in average quality occurs in spite of the fact that the lower quantiles of the quality distribution will
have increased if testing is effective.
The notion that costly and time-consuming certification requirements limit teacher supply or
adversely affect teacher quality is behind education reform efforts promoting “alternative certification” paths
for public school teachers.  Many researchers have noted that even though salaries tend to be higher in public
schools than private schools, bureaucratic and costly certification requirements may send the best teachers
to private schools, where these requirements are not imposed (e.g., Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000).  Note also
that if c includes the opportunity cost of time invested in test preparation and test taking, then testing costs
will be an increasing function of wi, further eroding the quality-enhancing effect of the lower bound,  w G.
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Finally, the discussion here presumes that teacher testing is of great value in predicting teacher quality.
While the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (1997) promotes this view, it seems
likely that the question of what teachers should know is not entirely clear-cut.  In practice, those with wi $ w G
may not actually be more productive in the classroom.7About one-third of districts appear in a subsequent round but we ignore this in the statistical analysis.
8For a list of sources used to compile state testing requirements, see the data appendix.
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DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Data for this study come from the Teacher Demand and Shortage Survey (TDSS), a component of
the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), which links information on school districts, teachers, and students.
The first round of the SASS was in the 1987-88 school year, followed by rounds in 1990-91, 1993-94, and
1999-2000.  The core survey in the SASS is a complex stratified sample of schools, drawn largely from the
Department of Education’s Common Core of Data (CCD) which is an administrative roster of schools from
state education agencies.  Data for the TDSS come from surveys distributed to superintendents of Local
Education Agencies (LEAs; essentially, school districts) containing sampled schools.  In addition, teachers
in sampled schools complete a Teacher Survey.  Other components of the SASS, not used here, include a
School Principal Survey, a Teacher Follow-up Survey, and a collection of student records (in 1993-94 only).
Our estimates use the weights provided with the TDSS to make sample statistics representative of US school
districts.
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Information on district testing requirements comes from the TDSS, as do other characteristics of the
district such as starting salaries and district size.  In addition, we aggregate responses to the teacher survey
up to the district level to provide district-level measures of teacher characteristics and quality such as the
proportion of teachers who teach in their subject.  We also match quality measures such as the average SAT
score in the teachers’ undergraduate institution from the Higher Education Research Institute to the SASS
LEA file.  Although these quality measures are not as detailed as we would like, average SAT score of
undergraduate institution is a frequently used measure of new teacher quality (see, e.g, Figlio, 2002).  Finally,
we collected information on state testing requirements for each survey year from published summaries.
8  The
sample used here excludes districts with less than 50 pupils, below about the first percentile in the district
size distribution.  The sample includes public schools only and omits charter schools in the last year8
(typically, each charter school is its own district).  For additional details on the construction of the sample
and variable definitions, see the data appendix.
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by survey year.  Each round contributes almost 5,000 districts.
The average district size is about 3,000 pupils and 160 teachers.  The table also shows the proportion of
districts with inexperienced teachers, defined as those hired in the last 3 years (preceding the survey) and
the proportion of districts with teachers hired in the past year.  Over 40 percent of districts have
inexperienced teachers and almost 20 percent have hired teachers in the past year.  In the analysis below, we
report results separately for the full sample, and for the 3-year and 1-year samples, since testing requirements
may have a bigger impact in districts that have recently been hiring.
The first outcome variable used to measure the impact of teacher testing  is teacher wages.  Although
the theoretical discussion suggests the effect of testing on the distribution of teachers’ alternate wages is
ambiguous, the effect on teachers’ wages is likely to be positive since testing restricts supply (note that w!c
has to exceed the quality threshold).  The SASS reports the wages paid to teachers in each district by
schooling and experience level, i.e., for teachers with a Bachelor’s degree (B.A.), with a Master’s degree
(M.A.), and with a Master’s degree plus 20 or more years of experience.  The table shows teacher wages for
those with a B.A. of around 25,000-26,000 (1999 dollars).  Wages went up between 1993-94 and 1999-2000.
Wages are also about 10 percent higher for those with an M.A., and much higher for experienced teachers
with a Master’s degree.  
To measure teacher quality we look at the average SAT scores of teachers’ undergraduate institution,
whether the institution is coded as a research university or liberal-arts college, the proportion of teachers with
alternative state certification, and the proportion of teachers with a degree in the subject they teach.  Note
that the SAT and Carnegie variables cannot be linked to the 1990-91 SASS since this round did not identify9A few large states reversed their basic skills testing requirements so the proportion of districts requiring
testing dipped between 1993 and 1999.  
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teachers’ undergraduate institutions.  The college-based quality variables show fairly stable quality over the
sample period.  In contrast, there is an increase in the proportion of inexperienced and new teachers with
alternative certification, and an increase in the proportion of teachers who have a degree in the subject they
teach.  Finally, the table provides descriptive information for other characteristics of the teacher workforce
that might be affected by licensing.  This includes the sex, race, and Hispanic ethnicity distribution among
all teachers and recently hired teachers.
Testing prevalence and requirements
The proportion of districts subject to a state-mandated basic skills test requirement increased from
just over 40% in 1987-88 to 70% in 1993-94.  This can be seen in the first row of Table 2, which reports the
prevalence of state test requirements based on our match of information for each state to the SASS.  Although
the number of districts requiring a basic skills test fell slightly between 1993-94 and 1999-2000, the number
of states requiring tests continued to increase and reached two-thirds.
9  Fewer states required a subject test
than required a test of basic skills in 1987, but this requirement also saw a dramatic and steady increase, so
that the proportion requiring subject and basic skills tests were about equal by 1999.  By 1999, over 80% of
districts faced some kind of state-mandated test requirement.
In addition to using published state testing requirements, we analyzed SASS questions put to district
administrators about the use of testing.  In particular, the following two questions are relevant:
Do you require or use information on whether an applicant passed a STATE test of 
basic skills?
Do you require or use information on whether an applicant passed a STATE test of 
subject knowledge?
SASS respondents (i.e., officials completing the SASS on behalf of the district) answered with: 10A district was determined to be dissonant if the response to both the basic skills and subject test questions
indicated  no test requirement and no test use while the state required testing.   We sampled up to 10 dissonant
districts in any state with dissonant districts.  Of the 322 districts sampled, we obtained responses from 211 districts
for a response rate of 66 percent.  In each district surveyed, we attempted to contact “the director of personnel or
someone knowledgeable about personnel policies in the district.”  The original sample contained 7 vocational
districts and one charter district, so these factors cannot account for reporting conflicts.  
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Require; 
Use, but not require; 
Do not use.  
Rows 4, 5, and 6, in Table 2 show the proportion of districts which report they require state tests.
Surprisingly, this proportion is below the proportion of districts who were subject to a state-mandated test
requirement.
The difference between state testing requirements and districts’ reported testing practices seems most
likely to be due to inaccurate  responses and misunderstandings of SASS questions related to applicant
screening.  We substantiated this hypothesis by surveying a sample of districts.  In particular, we
administered the applicant-qualifications portion of the 1999-2000 SASS to 211 “dissonant districts” ,
defined as those where SASS responses to questions on testing conflicted with state requirements.
10  In
response to our survey, only 13 percent of districts reported they neither use nor require a state test of basic
skills while only 17 percent reported they neither use nor require a state test of subject knowledge.  On
further inquiry with some districts, we discovered that where tests are required, districts may waive this under
difficult hiring conditions, but typically still hope to “use the test”.  An occasional source of confusion,
however, had to do with the definition of a “state requirement” or a “state test”.  For example, the state may
require ETS’s Praxis exam, not strictly speaking a state test along the lines of, say, the test developed and
used by districts in the state of Massachusetts.  In any case, the majority of districts in our sample appeared
to be trying to follow state testing mandates.  
The last three rows show the proportion of districts using tests based on a variable constructed by
recoding the response to SASS test-use questions to be consistent with state requirements (e.g., districts who11
report not using a subject test in a state that requires subject testing were recoded as using a subject test).
Not surprisingly, these recoded variables have higher means than the raw SASS responses in the second three
rows.  They also show a consistent pattern of increasing test use over time.  The impact of state requirements
on testing is gauged on the basis of these recoded variables.
Effects of state testing requirements on testing
The impact of state testing requirements on test use is summarized by regressing dummies for test
use on dummies for state mandates, along with state and year main effects, dummies for urban, suburban,
and rural districts, district enrollment, district fraction minority enrollment, and a quadratic in the state
unemployment rate.  In particular, Table 3 reports estimates of the coefficients "1 and "2 on basic skills and
subject test mandate dummies, bjt and sjt, in the equation
yijt = :s + *t + XijtN$ + "1bjt + "2sjt + ,ijt,( 3 )
where yijt is an indicator for district requirements, :s and *t are state and year effects, and Xi is the vector of
other covariates (including individual district controls and the state-level unemployment rate).  Some of the
models combine the separate basic skills and subject dummies into a single dummy for any test.  
Even in states that do not require testing, many districts use tests.   Estimates of equation (3) can
therefore be seen as a measuring the difference between test use with and without requirements. Table 3
shows that state-mandated basic skills testing increases the likelihood of basic skills testing in school districts
by about 50 percent.  As can be seen in column 2, subject test requirements are also correlated with the use
of basic skills tests, but column 3 shows that when both dummies are included, the basic skills requirement
dominates.  The reverse pattern appears in columns 5-7 for models with the use of subject tests on the left
hand side.  The imposition of any test requirement also increases the likelihood of testing by about 50
percent.  Moreover, as the lower two-thirds of Table 3 shows, these effects are similar when the sample of
districts is limited to those that have new or inexperienced teachers.  11The regression estimates reported here and elsewhere in the paper were weighted using district sampling
weights.  Standard errors are corrected for state-year clustering.  
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EFFECTS ON WAGES
State testing requirements are associated with slightly higher wages.  This can be seen in Table 4a,
which reports estimates of equation (3) for models with the log of teacher salaries on the left hand side.
Many of the estimated salary effects are significant.  For example, column 1 shows that the salaries of
teachers with a B.A. degree are about 2.4 percent higher when states require a test of basic skills, an effect
estimated with a standard error of .009.
11  Subject test requirements also appear to be associated with higher
wages, though the estimated effects of testing requirements are not significant when both the subject and
basic skill testing variables are entered at the same time.  
Most new teachers have a B.A.  As the estimates in columns 5-8 and 9-12 show, however, state
testing requirements are also associated with higher wages for teachers with an M.A. and for experienced
teachers with an M.A.  Since teachers with more advanced degrees and more experience are less likely to
have been hired recently, these effects may reflect the maintenance of relative wages by shifting the entire
pay scale in response to testing requirements.  It should also be noted that in some states that require tests
for new hires, experienced teachers are subject to periodic re-certification tests as well.
An alternative interpretation of the increase in wages for more educated or more experienced
teachers is that these effects reflect some sort of omitted variables bias.  The possibility of omitted variables
bias is also raised by the fact that the estimated wage effects are similar in the full sample and the samples
of districts with inexperienced and new-teachers.  Because testing requirements are time-varying state-level
variables, the most likely source of bias is some sort of state-specific trend in teacher wages in states that
adopt testing requirements.  Therefore, as a specification check we re-estimated the wage equations using
a model that adds state-specific linear trends to specification (3).   This controls for the fact that teacher
wages may be increasing due to secular trends such as a growing economy that contribute to the demand for12Angus (2001) and Ravitch (2002) argue that teacher certification requirements have been used to control
entry into the teaching profession since the mid-19th Century.  The major players in the struggle to control entry
have been classroom teachers, professors of education and pedagogy, and professors of liberal-arts subjects.  Various
groups were typically successful at increasing barriers to entry at times of abundant relative teacher supply.  For
example, testing was a relatively common component of teacher certification in the early part of the 20
th century.  As
World War II drew current and potential teachers to other industries and occupations, however, states recognized
districts’ need to circumvent the strict licensure requirements. As a result, the use of tests declined dramatically
during the war.  Note that endogeneity of this sort would tend to bias our estimated wage effects towards zero. 
13We also looked at whether testing has a different effect in non-union districts, as suggested by Figlio
(2002).  We found no clear pattern of differences in impact by union status.  It should be noted, however, that the
precision of union/non-union interactions is limited by the facts that the SASS collected district union status for only
two years and over 70% of districts are unionized.
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higher entry barriers.  One possibility, for example, is that unions raise entry barriers in good times.  On the
other hand, our survey of district personnel officers suggests districts and therefore perhaps also states want
to weaken formal requirements when teachers are hard to find.
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The results of estimating equation (3) with state-specific linear trends, reported in Table 4b, show
even stronger wage effects than appear in Table 4a.  For example, the imposition of a state test of basic skills
is associated with roughly 3.3% higher wages for teachers with a B.A., a precisely estimated effect.
Moreover, the effects of requiring tests of basic skills and subject matter remain significant when entered
jointly.  The fact that estimates with state trends are larger is consistent with the view that testing provisions
are weakened in a strong economy.  Most importantly, the pattern of effects is now more consistent with a
causal interpretation that attributes higher wages to the impact of state testing regulations.  In particular, the
effects of testing are generally larger for teachers with a B.A. than for those with more education or
experience, consistent with the notion that entry wages should change the most in response to barriers.
Similarly, the effects are larger in the sample of districts that have new or inexperienced teachers than in the
full sample of districts.
13  
Finally, it is worth repeating that the first-stage estimates of the effect of testing requirements in
Table 3 are on the order of 50 percentage points.  This implies that two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates
of the effect of the use of testing on teacher wages – using state testing regulations as instruments – are about14The resulting 2SLS estimates need not capture the average causal effect of licensing on wages since the
amount teachers must be compensated to take a test may be a function of the relative scarcity of non-tested jobs. 
Assuming such general equilibrium effects are modest, however, the implied 2SLS estimates can be seen as
capturing the average causal effect of licensing for districts that would not otherwise chose to test, in a world with
the observed baseline prevalence of testing.
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twice as large as the reduced-form effects of testing regulations reported in Table 4.
14  
EFFECTS ON QUALITY AND OTHER OUTCOMES
Although state testing requirements are associated with increased use of teacher tests and with higher
teacher wages, there is little evidence that this translates into better teachers, at least along the quality
dimensions we can measure.  For example, columns 1-4 of Table 5 show no clear pattern of an association
between testing requirements and the quality of teacher’s undergraduate institutions as measured by average
SAT scores.  While a required subject test is associated with a marginally significant increase in test scores
when both testing requirements are entered jointly and the sample includes districts with inexperienced
teachers (column 3), this effect is smaller and insignificant in all other specifications in this sample, and
insignificant and negative in the sample of districts with new teachers.  Similarly the estimates in columns
5-8 do not point to an association between testing and the quality of teachers’ undergraduate institutions as
measured by the institutions’ classification as a research university or a liberal arts college.
Two other measures of quality, alternative certification and whether teachers majored in their
teaching subject, describe teachers’ job assignments as opposed to teachers’ educational background.  Of
course, the use of alternative certification methods could be seen as a plus or a minus, depending on the value
of traditional certification methods as a quality screen.  An important question for our purposes, however,
is whether the introduction of tests is confounded with other sorts of licensing reforms.  As it turns out,
alternative certification is uncorrelated with testing requirements.  This suggests that it is reasonable to look
at testing requirements in isolation.
In contrast with the alternative certification results, the probability that a teacher majored in their15
teaching subject appears to rise in states that impose a subject test.  On the other hand, this effect is not very
robust.  When estimated in the sample of inexperienced teachers, the imposition of a subject test increases
the probability teachers teach in their major by about 2.7 percent, with a standard error of .011, but the
corresponding estimate is about half as large and insignificant in the sample of new teachers.
The last set of estimates looks at the relationship between state testing requirements and the
demographic make-up of the teaching labor force.  This inquiry is motivated partly by the fact that
standardized tests are sometimes thought to be more of a barrier for minorities.  The first 4 columns of Table
6 show no relationship between state testing requirements and the percent of new or inexperienced teachers
who are black.  On the other hand, there is some evidence of a negative association between testing
requirements, especially for basic skills, and the number of new teachers who are Hispanic.  Columns 5-8
suggest that testing requirements reduce the proportion of new teachers who are Hispanic by about 2
percentage points, a large effect given that only 5 percent of new teachers were Hispanic in 1999-2000.
Finally, there is no relationship between testing requirements and the proportion of teachers who are female.
CONCLUSIONS
Recent years have seen an acceleration in the use of standardized tests when certifying new teachers.
Proponents hope these measures will help to maintain quality, but economists have long been skeptical of
entry barriers that may shift supply and discourage otherwise qualified applicants.  Our investigation of the
impact of the use of tests to certify teachers for employment in public schools suggests state requirements
increase the use of tests by about 50 percentage points.  Testing requirements are also associated with higher
teacher wages, consistent with a supply-shift story.  Taking estimates from models that control for state-
specific linear trends, the reduced form effect of testing on wages is 3-5%.  The implied two-stage least
squares effect of the use of tests is twice as large.  But there is little evidence of an impact of testing on
teacher quality, at least as we measure it.  Thus, our results are consistent with the view that testing has acted15It may be instructive to compare the relatively free-wheeling US academic labor market with that of Italy
and Germany, where faculty are subject to testing.  The top Ph.D. programs in the US are full of students from these
countries so the undergraduate talent is clearly there.  But our impression from discussions with foreign colleagues is
that these requirements are widely seen by recent American-trained Ph.D.s as protecting domestically trained and
generally less productive incumbents. 
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more as a barrier to entry than a quality screen.  Another interesting finding is the negative association
between teacher testing and probability new teachers are Hispanic.   
As a final bit of anecdotal evidence in support of a skeptical view of testing, it is worth observing
that while occupational licensing requirements are widespread and apparently increasing, most skilled
workers in the private sector are not subject to formal licensing or testing.  For example, like many
professionals involved in research, American professors are not tested by their universities or even by most
(non-civil-service) non-academic employers.
15  
Concerns about testing notwithstanding, the question of how to increase and maintain the quality of
the public-sector teacher labor force remains.  Ballou’s (1996) results indicate that school districts pay
surprisingly little attention to the selectiveness of applicants undergraduate institution.  Along these lines,
Manski (1987) suggested that a floor for teachers’ SAT scores could provide a useful screen.  A reliance on
SATs would appear to avoid some of the problems outlined in our theoretical discussion since this avoids
the establishment of a unique barrier to teaching, and may also force school districts to focus more on college
quality. This naturally raises the question of whether teachers with higher SAT scores are indeed better
teachers, a subject for future research.17
Data Appendix:
The analysis extract was drawn from the Public School Teacher Demand and Shortage Survey
(TDSS) component of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS).  The TDSS is administered to a stratified
random sample of school districts in the U.S.  The data used in the analysis are from the restricted-use files
of the 1987-88, 1990-91, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 waves of the SASS.  Individual teacher-level information
is extracted from the Teacher Questionnaire of the SASS.  Characteristics of colleges attended by teachers
are then merged by college FICE codes to the teacher-level data. These data are then weighted by sampling
means, aggregated to the district level, and merged to the district-level TDSS.  Finally, state-by-year
economic measures are merged to the data set. Districts with fewer than 50 students are dropped from the
analysis, as are charter districts in the 1999-2000 wave.   Throughout the analysis, first-year teachers are
defined as teachers who report their first year of teaching to be the year of the survey.  Inexperienced teachers
are defined as teachers who report their first year of teaching to be less than four years before the year of the
survey.
The following definitions were used to create outcome variables extracted from the SASS:
Salary: B.A.: Data come from district-level responses.  The base salary paid to a teacher in the district with
a Bachelor’s of Arts degree, no teaching experience, and no other relevant credentials.  Responses are
inflated to 1999 dollars using the CPI-U.  
Salary: M.A.: Data come from district-level responses.  The base salary paid to a teacher in the district with
a Master’s degree, no teaching experience, and no other relevant credentials.  Responses are inflated to 1999
dollars using the CPI-U.
Salary: M.A. + 20 years: Data come from district-level responses.  The base salary paid to a teacher in the
district with a Master’s degree, at least 20 years teaching experience, and no other relevant credentials.
Responses are inflated to 1999 dollars using the CPI-U.
Majored in Teaching Subject: Data come from individual teacher responses.  A dummy is created that equals
one if one of the following three criteria are met: (1) the teacher’s primary teaching assignment is
Mathematics and he completed either a B.A, M.A. Ph.D. or Education Specialist degree with a major in
either Mathematics, Engineering or Economics; (2) the teacher’s primary teaching assignment is English and
he completed either a B.A, M.A. Ph.D. or Education Specialist degree with a major in English Literature,
Letters, Speech, Classics or Composition; (3) the teacher’s primary teaching assignment is either Biology,
Chemistry, Geology/Earth Science, Physics or General Science and he completed either a B.A, M.A. Ph.D.
or Education Specialist degree with a major in either Biology, Chemistry, Geology/Earth Science, Physics,
or another Physical Science.  This dummy variable is then aggregated using sampling weights to compute
the fraction of first-year teachers and inexperienced teachers for which the dummy is equal to one.
Alternative Certification:  Data come from individual teacher responses. Teachers are asked what type of
state certification they hold in their main assignment field.  A dummy is created that equals zero if the teacher
describes his certification as either regular, standard or advanced, and one otherwise.  This dummy variable
is then aggregated using sampling weights to compute the fraction of first-year teachers and inexperienced
teachers for which the dummy is equal to one.
The following definitions are used to define hiring-practices variables extracted from the SASS:18
Requires Basic Skills Test: Data are drawn from the TDSS survey of school districts.  Districts are asked
whether they require teaching applicants to have passed a test of basic skills.  A dummy is created which is
equal to one if the district requires a state test of basic skills, a district test of basic skills or the National
Teachers Exam/Praxis.  In some of the analysis, this variable is automatically switched to one if the district
is in a state that is mandated by law to require new teachers to pass a standardized test of basic skills. 
Requires Subject Test: Data are drawn from the TDSS survey of school districts.  Districts are asked whether
they require teaching applicants to have passed a test of basic skills.  A dummy is created which is equal to
one if the district requires a state subject test, a district subject test or the National Teachers Exam/Praxis.
In some of the analysis, this variable is automatically switched to one if the district is in a state that is
mandated by law to require new teachers to pass a standardized subject test. 
The following definitions are used to define quality measures of undergraduate institutions attended by
teachers:
Average SAT Score: Data come from a survey conducted by the Higher Education Research Institute.  The
average combined Math and Verbal SAT score of entering freshman in the fall of 1983 is collected for
colleges and universities from college guides and from surveys of college representatives.  For schools that
do not require students to take the SAT, ACT averages are translated into SAT averages using the following
methodology.  Samples of students who took both the SAT and ACT, or who took either test and a third
common test (the National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test) are compared.  These overlapping samples
are used to compute the equivalent percentiles in each test’s distribution.  ACT scores are then replaced with
the corresponding SAT scores at the equivalent point in the distribution.
Attended Research University or Liberal Arts College: A dummy variable is created that equals one if the
college attended by the teacher is in one of the following categories of the Carnegie Classification of
Institutions of Higher Education (1994 definitions): Research University I, Research University II, or
Baccalaureate (Liberal Arts) Colleges I.  The three categories included in the dummy are the three non-
specialized categories with average SAT scores greater than 1000.
Information on state testing laws was drawn from the following sources:
Teacher Education Policy in the States: A 50-State Survey of Legislative and Administrative Actions,
American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (Washington, DC: December 1994).
Teacher Education Policy in the States: A 50-State Survey of Legislative and Administrative Actions,
American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (Washington, DC: Spring 1994).
Goertz, Margaret E., State Educational Standards in the 50 States: An Update, Educational Testing Service
(Princeton, NJ: March 1988).
Coley, Richard J. and Goertz, Margaret E., Educational Standards in the 50 States: 1990, Educational
Testing Service (Princeton, NJ: June 1990).
Rudner, Lawrence M., What’s Happening in Teacher Testing: An Analysis of State Teacher Testing
Practices, U.S. Department of Education (Washington, DC: August 1987).
The NASDTEC Manual on the Preparation and Certification of Educational Personnel, Kendall/Hunt
Publishing Company (Dubuque, IA: 1999).19
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Labour Economics 5, 359-383.Table 1: Means of Selected Variables
All Districts Sample with Inexperienced Teachers Sample with First-year Teachers
87-88 90-91 93-94 99-00 87-88 90-91 93-94 99-00 87-88 90-91 93-94 99-00
Unweighted Count 4,790 4,831 4,920 4,644 2,073 2,277 2,390 2,374 930 1,068 1,166 1,138
District Characteristics
Enrollment 2,751 2,826 2,976 3,402 4,069 3,943 4,372 5,257 6,257 5,405 6,365 7,855
Full-time Equivalent
Teachers
158.1 159.3 159.0 211.0 227.6 218.1 227.8 320.2 343.3 293.5 327.6 470.1
Frac.  w/ 
Inexperienced Teachers
.401 .426 .427 .446 1 1 1 1   0 0 0 0
Frac.  w/
First-year Teachers
. 1 6 4 . 1 9 4 . 1 8 6 . 1 9 2 0000 1111
Teacher Wage and Quality Measures
Salary: B.A. 25,344 25,481 25,320 25,898 25,071 25,009 24,883 26,074 25,076 24,680 24,724 26,232
Salary: M.A. 27,683 27,765 27,649 28,303 27,327 27,265 27,150 28,489 27,335 26,965 27,020 28,673
Salary: M.A. + 20 years
experience
41,939 42,529 42,950 44,108 40,992 41,250 41,478 43,948 41,145 40,415 41,213 43,777
Average SAT 907.4 - 909.9 905.2 905.7 - 906.5 907.5 912.6 - 908.8 910.5
Attended Research Univ.
or Liberal Arts Coll.
.218 - .227 .210 .229 - .220 .214 .264 - .256 .213
Majored in Teaching
Subject
.067 .065 .074 .077 .075 .079 .095 .109 .075 .079 .092 .123
Frac. w/ Alternative
Certification
.104 .075 .084 .116 .306 .316 .287 .402 .369 .382 .377 .516
Other Teacher Characteristics
Fraction Female .693 .677 .662 .695 .720 .666 .645 .666 .700 .647 .634 .676
Fraction  Black .026 .029 .025 .028 .024 .018 .027 .036 .024 .022 .047 .042
Fraction Hispanic .015 .018 .020 .029 .025 .027 .044 .043 .021 .048 .056 .050
Notes: District-weighted means are reported.  Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience. All salaries are reported in 1999 dollars. 
Average SAT, Fraction of Teachers who Attended Carnegie I Schools, and Fraction of Teachers with Alternative Certification are measured for all teachers, inexperienced teachers
or first-year teachers.  For all other variables, district means are estimated using all schools or using the sample of schools that employ either inexperienced or first-year teachers.Table 2: Testing Requirements and Prevalence
Proportion of Districts Proportion of States




.429 .622 .697 .648 .431 .588 .627 .667
Requires Subject
Test
.336 .365 .538 .674 .373 .373 .529 .608
Requires Any Test .540 .693 .736 .820 .529 .647 .667 .803
District Response in the SASS
Uses Basic Skills
Test
.361 .425 .493 .646
Uses Subject Test .243 .341 .394 .552
Uses Any Test .379 .452 .514 .669




.554 .726 .778 .827
Uses Subject Test .494 .613 .703 .799
Uses Any Test .612 .744 .802 .880
Notes: The first 4 columns report weighted fractions of districts.  The top panel reports fraction (of states or districts) that require new
teachers to pass basic skills and/or subject tests to be licensed.  The middle panel reports the fraction of districts that report in the
SASS that they require teaching candidates to have passed basic skills and/or subject tests.  The bottom panel reports the fraction of
districts that either report in the SASS that they require teaching candidates to have passed basic skills and/or subject tests or are in
a state that requires that they do so.Table 3: First-stage estimates with state and year fixed effects
District Requires Basic Skills Test District Requires Subject Test

























































































2 .706 .622 .707 .682 .539 .631 .631 .595
N 3,008
Notes: Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience.  The table reports OLS
estimates of equation (3).  The dependent variable is an indicator for whether districts either report in the SASS that they
use information on whether teaching candidates passed a basic skills or subject test or are in a state that requires that they
do so.  Controls include state and year fixed effects, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the state
unemployment rate, district enrollment, and district fraction minority enrollment.  All regressions are weighted using district
sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.Table 4a: Wage Estimates Controlling for State and Year Fixed Effects
Log (Salary with B.A.) Log (Salary with M.A.) Log (Salary with M.A. + 20 yrs)























































































































2 .866 .866 .866 .865 .839 .839 .840 .839 .786 .785 .787 .786
N 2,979
Notes:  Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience.   Reported coefficients are estimated from a regression of log salary
on state testing requirement dummy variables and a set of controls.  Controls include state and year fixed effects, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the
state unemployment rate, district enrollment, and district fraction minority enrollment.  All regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors
corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.Table 4b: Wage Estimates Controlling for State and Year Fixed Effects and State-specific Linear Trends
Log (Salary with B.A.) Log (Salary with M.A.) Log (Salary with M.A. + 20 yrs)





















































































































2 .886 .886 .887 .885 .860 .861 .861 .859 .800 .801 .801 .800
N 2,979
Notes:  Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience.   The estimates are from models as in Table 4a, with the addition of
state-specific linear trends.  All regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are
reported in parentheses.Table 5: Teacher Quality Estimates
College Selectivity
Average SAT  Research Univ. or Liberal Arts Coll.



























































2 .239 .239 .239 .239 .072 .072 .072 .072
N 3,008 3,160
Other Qualifications
Alternative Certification  Majored in Teaching Subject



























































2 .183 .183 .183 .183 .027 .027 .027 .027
N 4,302 4,302
Notes:  Inexperienced teachers have less than 4 years teaching experience.   Dependent variables are: Average SAT of matriculating
freshmen in 1983 at teachers’ undergraduate institution; the fraction of teachers that attended colleges in a Carnegie Research
University I & II or Baccalaureate (Liberal Arts) College I; an indicator for whether the teacher was hired without regular state
certification (alternatives are temporary certification, provisional certification and emergency certification); the fraction of teachers
whose primary teaching assignment is in the same subject as their B.A, M.A., Ph.D or Education Specialist degree major.  Controls
include state and year fixed effects, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the state unemployment rate, district enrollment,
and district fraction minority enrollment.  All regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for
state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.  There are fewer observations for the Average SAT and
Carnegie Type I specifications because the 1990-91 SASS does not report the teacher’s undergraduate college.Table 6: Teacher Characteristics Estimates
Fraction Black Fraction Hispanic Fraction Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)






































2 .141 .141 .141 .141 .081 .081 .081 .081 .032 .032 .032 .032 







































2 .162 .162 .162 .162 .126 .126 .126 .042 .042 .042 .042
N 4,302 4,302 4,302
Notes:  Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience.   Dependent variables are the fraction of inexperienced or first-year teachers in the
district who fall into the respective category.  Reported coefficients are estimated from an OLS regression on state testing requirement dummy variables and a set of controls.  Controls
include state and year fixed effects, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the state unemployment rate, district enrollment, and district fraction minority enrollment.  All
regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.